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The Concept of National Cinema

Although the term "national cinema" is often used to describe simply the films produced within a particular nation-state, this is neither the only way in which the term bas been used, nor is it, I want to argue, the most appropriate way of using the term. This article is not, however, intended as an examination of any historically concrete national cinema. It is intended instead as an exploration of some of the implications of using the term "national" in discourse about cinema (the film industry, film culture), moving towards an argument that the parameters of a national cinema should be drawn at the site of consumption as much as at the site of production of films; an argument, in other words, that focuses on the activity of national audiences and the conditions under which they make sense of and use the films they watch. In so far as reference is made to historically specific national cinemas, most of my examples will relate to British cinema (and, of course, Hollywood), but I would hope that much of what I have to say is generalizable to other national cinemas—at least those of Western Europe—as well.[1]

The concept of national cinema has been appropriated in a variety of ways, for a variety of reasons: there is not a single universally accepted discourse of national cinema. In general terms, one can summarize these various mobilizations of the concept as follows. First, there is the possibility of defining national cinema in economic terms, establishing a conceptual correspondence between the terms "national cinema" and "the domestic film industry," and therefore being concerned with such questions as: Where are these films made,

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and by whom? Who owns and controls the industrial infrastructures, the production companies, the distributors and the exhibition circuits? Second, there is the possibility of a text-based approach to national cinema. Here the key questions become: What are these films about? Do they share a common style or world view? What sort of projections of the national character do they offer? To what extent are they engaged in "exploring, questioning and constructing a notion of nationhood in the films themselves and in the consciousness of the viewer"?[2]

Third, there is the possibility of an exhibition-led, or consumption-based, approach to national cinema. Here the major concern has always been to do with the question of which films audiences are watching, and particularly the number of foreign, and usually American films which have high-profile distribution within a particular nation-state—a concern which is generally formulated in terms of an anxiety about cultural imperialism. Fourth, there is what may be called a criticism-led approach to national cinema, which tends to reduce national cinema to the terms of a quality art cinema, a culturally worthy cinema steeped in the high-cultural and/or modernist heritage of a particular nation-state, rather than one that appeals to the desires and fantasies of the popular audiences.

In other words, very often the concept of national cinema is used prescriptively rather than descriptively, citing what *ought* to be the national cinema, rather than describing the actual cinematic experience of popular audiences. As Geoffrey Nowell-Smith has noted, it has always been something of a struggle to enable "the recognition of popular forms a a legitimate part of national cultural life."[3]

If these are some of the ways in which the term national cinema has been used, what are the processes by which, or what are the conditions under which, a particular mode of film practice, or a specific range of textual practices, or a particular set of industrial practices comes to be named a national cinema? Indeed, what is involved in calling forth the idea of a national anything, cultural or otherwise? In other words, what is involved in positing the idea of nationhood or national identity?

To identify a national cinema is first of all to specify a coherence and a unity; it is to proclaim a unique identity and a stable set of

meanings. The process of identification is thus invariably a hegemonizing, mythologising process, involving both the production and assignation of a particular set of meanings, and the attempt to contain, or prevent the potential proliferation of other meanings. At the same time, the concept of a national cinema has almost invariably been mobilised as a strategy of cultural (and economic) resistance: a means of asserting national autonomy in the face of (usually) Hollywood's international domination.

The process of nationalist mythmaking is not simply an insidious (or celebratory) work of ideological production, but is also at the same time a means of setting one body of images and values against another, which will very often threaten to overwhelm the first. The search for a unique and stable identity, the assertion of national specificity does then have some meaning, some usefulness. It is not just an ideological sleight of hand although it must always also be recognised as that. Histories of national cinema can only therefore really be understood as histories of crisis and conflict, of resistance and negotiation. But also, in another way, they are histories of a business seeking a secure footing in the marketplace, enabling the maximisation of an industry's profits while at the same time bolstering a nation's cultural standing. At this level, the politics of national cinema can be reduced to a marketing strategy, an attempt to market the diverse as, in fact, offering a coherent and singular experience. As Thomas Elsaesser has suggested, "internationally, national cinemas used to have a generic function: a French, Italian or a Swedish film sets different horizons of expectation for the general audience—a prerequisite for marketing purposes,"[4] and it is this attempt to establish a generic narrative image, a particular horizon of expectation, which is at stake.

There are perhaps two central methods, conceptually, of establishing or identifying the imaginary coherence, the specificity, of a national cinema. First, there is the method of comparing and contrasting one cinema to another, thereby establishing varying degrees of otherness. Second, there is what might be termed a more inward-looking process, exploring the cinema of a nation in relation to other already-existing economies and cultures of that nation-state.

The first of these means of defining a national cinema is premised upon the semiotic principle of the production of meaning and identity through difference. The task is to try to establish the identity of one national cinema by its relationship to and differentiation from other national cinemas: British cinema is what it is by virtue of what it is not—American cinema, or French cinema, or German cinema, etc. . . . Elsaesser again: "Other countries try to maintain themselves on a terrain staked out by the competition. West Germany is one example, but the implications affect all developed countries whose wase of cultural identity is based on a need to maintain markers—and markets—of difference vis-à-vis the products of the international entertainment business."[5] To some extent, then, the process of defining a national cinema, and thereby establishing some sort of unique and self-contained identity, takes meaning in the context of a conceptual play of differences and identities. And, as Benedict Anderson has argued, "nations . . . cannot be imagined except in the midst of an irremediable plurality of other nations."[6]

Within this discourse cinema itself is almost taken for granted, and the task becomes one of differentiating between a variety of apparently nationally constituted modes of cinematic practice and filmically produced signs and meanings. Such an operation becomes increasingly problematic as cinema develops in an economy characterised by the international ownership and circulation of images and sounds. It is therefore necessary to examine the overdetermination of Hollywood in the international arena. By Hollywood, I mean the international institutionalization of certain standards and values of cinema, in terms of both audience expectations, professional ideologies and practices and the establishment of infrastructures of production, distribution, exhibition, and marketing, to accommodate, regulate, and reproduce these standards and values. While Hollywood's classical period and its studio system may have disappeared, whatever the prophecies about the end of cinema in the late 1970s and early 1980s, cinema—and Hollywood—are, in the late 1980s, still very much alive and key components in the international mass entertainment business. This is the era of the multiplex, the package deal, the blockbuster, but also the revival of genre cinema and the

serial film, even if the site and system of delivery are no longer primarily theatrical.

Hollywood never functions as simply one term within a system of equally weighted differences. Hollywood is not only the most internationally powerful cinema—it has also, of course, for many years been an integral and naturalised part of the national culture, or the popular imagination, of most countries in which cinema is an established entertainment form. In other words, Hollywood has become one of those cultural traditions which feed into the so-called national cinemas of, for instance, the western European nations. "Hollywood can hardly be conceived . . . as totally other, since so much of any nation's film culture is implicitly 'Hollywood.'"[7] Being both a naturalised part of national culture, and also, visibly different, even exotic,[8] Hollywood thus functions as a doubled mode of popular fantasy, hence its propensity to be dismissed as escapism.

Geoffrey Nowell-Smith has attempted to account for the appeal of American films in the British market as follows—and his account would seem at least to be partially applicable to other national cinemas as well:

> The hidden history of cinema in British culture, and in popular culture in particular, has been the history of American films popular with the British public. The strength of American cinema was never just economic . . . [and] the basic reason for Hollywood's dominance was artistic and cultural. The American cinema set out in the first place to be popular in America where it served an extremely diverse and largely immigrant public. What made it popular at home also helped make it popular abroad. The ideology of American cinema has tended to be far more democratic than that of the cinema of other countries. This in part reflects the actual openness of American society, but it is above all a rhetorical strategy to convince the audiences of the virtues and pleasures of being American. Translated into the export arena, this meant a projection of America as intensely—if distantly—appealing. When matched against American films of the same period, their British counterparts came across all too often as restricting and stifling, subservient to middle class artistic models and to middle- and upper-class values.[9]

At times, Nowell-Smith's claims seem overstated.[10] To suggest, for instance, that "British cinema . . . has never been truly popular in Britain"[11] is to ignore the box-office success over the years of numerous British stars, film, genres and cycles of film. And to argue in terms of a generalised, monolithic "British public" is to ignore class, race, gender and regional differences. Even so, Nowell-Smith's revaluation of American films in terms of the appeal of apparently democratic aspirations seems useful. For a start, it displaces the idea that American box-office success in foreign markets is due solely to manipulative marketing and aggressive economic control. Furthermore, it challenges the conventional attacks, both conservative and radical, on American culture by noting the way in which its integration into the British cultural formation broadens the cultural repertoire available to audiences. As Tony Bennett has suggested, the argument that America is involved in a form of cultural imperialism "although not without point . . . misses much of the essential ambivalence of the impact of American popular culture in Britain which, in many respects, has been more positive, particularly in making avaliable a repertoire of cultural styles and resources . . . which, in various ways, have undercut and been consciously mobilised against the cultural hegemony of Britain's traditional élites."[12]

The rhetoric of democracy and populism is built into the formal organization of the American film, with its classically strong and dynamic narrative drive towards individual achievement—although this also points to the limitations of the rhetoric, since problems and their resolutions are invariably articulated only in relation to the *individual* within a substantially unchanged capitalist patriarchy. Further, classical Hollywood cinema conventionally ties this narrative structure of achievement to the romantic appeal of the formation of the heterosexual couple, and situates the narrative both within a visual form whose mise-en-scène and organisation of spectacle and spectating has proved intensely pleasurable, and within a physical context of film-watching which emphasises the process of fantasising. Overall, this form has a propensity to engage the spectator thoroughly in a complex series of identifications, with an almost ruthless disregard of the nationality (as well as class and

gender) of the spectator, and it is often the figure of the star which holds together these various formal strategies, narrative, visual and identificatory.

This is not to suggest that many British films, for instance, do not also work within the same formal system. But it is generally accepted that American filmmakers innovated, applied, and exploited this form of filmmaking much earlier and more consistently than their British counterparts who operated with a much more mixed, and so-called "primitive," variety of modes of representation, compared to Hollywood where this mode of representation had become institutionalised by 1917. It is also generally accepted that Hollywood has had the resources, which British film producers have lacked, to exploit the potential appeals of the institutional mode of representation.[13] Thus, for instance, British cinema has never been able to sustain a star system on the same glamorous scale as Hollywood for long periods of time—not least since Hollywood tends to consume British stars for its own films, thereby increasing the stake that British audiences have in those films.

If we confine discussion to film production, it makes sense in this context to speak of national cinemas as nonstandard and marginal activities. Part of the problem, of course, is the paradox that for a cinema to be nationally popular it must also be international in scope. That is to say, it must achieve the international (Hollywood) standard. For, by and large, it is the films of the major American distributors which achieve national box-office success, so that filmmakers who aspire to this same level of box-office popularity must attempt to reproduce the standard, which in practice means colluding with Hollywood's systems of funding, production control, distribution and marketing. Any alternative means of achieving national *popular* success must, if it is to be economically viable, be conceived on an international scale, which is virtually impossible for a national film industry, unless it has a particularly large domestic market, as in the case of the Bombay film industry. The difficulty is to establish some sort of balance between the "apparently incompatible objectives of a national cinema—to be economically viable but culturally motivated," "to be 'national' in what is essentially an international industry."[14]

Historically, at least within the Western European countries, there has been one major solution to this problem, one central strategy for attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable and maintain both some form of national cultural specificity and achieve a relative degree of international visibility and economic viability: the production of an art cinema, a nationally-based (and in various ways state-subsidised) cinema of quality. As Steve Neale has argued, art cinema has played a central role "in the attempts made by a number of European countries both to counter American domination of their indigenous markets in film and also to foster a film industry and a film culture of their own."[15] The discourses of "art," "culture," and "quality," and of "national identity" and "nationhood," have historically been mobilised against Hollywood's mass entertainment film, and used to justify various nationally specific economic systems of support and protection. But there are two further points to note here. First, that this is yet another instance of "the peculiarity of a national film production within an international marketplace,"[16] since the market for art cinema is indeed decidedly international, as is the network of film festivals and reviewing practices, and other means of achieving a critical reputation and both a national and an international cultural space for such films.[17] And second, that perhaps the situation isn't quite so peculiar after all, given the increasing tendency for international co-productions (invariably with the involvement of one or other of the still-extant national television networks), and the development of transnational forms of industry support and protection within the European Community.

However, the various international art cinemas have rarely achieved a national popular success, partly because of their modes of address, and partly because of the international hegemony of Hollywood at the level of distribution, exhibition and marketing. Indeed, in the case of the British film industry at least, the distribution and exhibition arms of that industry have primarily been organized to foster, extend, and consolidate the domination of the British market by American popular film. Thus for some time the major American studios have had their own distribution companies operating in Britain, while the major British companies have built up close relationships with American producers and distributors, who often also

have substantial financial interests in British companies. British companies have found this sort of cooperation necessary, since, in capitalist terms, the American film industry was much better organised before the British film industry, and was able to pursue imperialist policies with some vigour, undercutting the charges of local distributors, since they could go into the British market in the knowledge that costs had already been recovered from the huge American domestic market.[18]

In other words, the influence of Hollywood on domestic markets is always much more than simply a question of the poverty or élitism of domestic filmmaking. This suggests that national cinema needs to be explored not only in relation to production, but also in relation to the questions of distribution and exhibition, audiences, and consumption, within each nation-state. The idea that Hollywood—and now, of course, television—has become a part of the popular imagination of British cinema audiences needs to be taken seriously.

As such, it becomes insufficient to define national cinema solely by contrasting one national cinema to another, and we need also to take into account the other key way of defining a national cinema—what I have suggested is a more *inward-looking* means, constituting a national cinema not so much in terms of its difference from other cinemas, but in terms of its relationship to an already existing national political, economic and cultural identity (in so far as a single coherent identity can be established) and set of traditions. In this way, British cinema would be defined in terms of already established discourses of Britishness, by turning in on itself, on its own history and cultural formation, and the defining ideologies of national identity and nationhood, rather than by reference to other national cinemas—bearing in mind always that Hollywood may itself be an integral part of that cultural formation.

At one level, in terms of political economy, a national cinema is a particular industrial structure; a particular pattern of ownership and control of plant, real estate, human resources and capital, and a system of state legislation which circumscribes the nationality of that ownership—primarily in relation to production. The relative economic power of a notional film industry will depend upon the degree to which production, distribution, and exhibition are integrated, regulated, technically equipped, and capitalised; the size of the home market and the degree of penetration of overseas markets. At the level of production, we need to take into account both the means and modes of production employed (the organisation of work, in terms of systems of management, division of labour, professional organisations and ideologies, availability of technology, etc.) and the access that producers have to both domestic and overseas markets. It is important to recognise also that even the domestic market is not homogeneous, and that production companies often deliberately limit themselves to specific areas of exploitation, especially when faced with the mainstream box-office supremacy of the major American distributors overseas. These limited areas of exploitation will, in many cases, be areas considered marginal (that is, marginally profitable) by Hollywood (low-budget films, B movies, films made primarily for the domestic market rather than for export, art cinema, and so on).

It is worth underlining again the role of the state, and the terms of its intervention in the practices of a film industry, in determining the parameters and possibilities of a national cinema (as both an economically viable and a culturally motivated institution)—at least since the mid 1910s, when governments began to recognise the potential ideological power of cinema, and cinema itself could seem to be something like a national cultural form, an institution with a nationalising function. But it is also important to recognise that the state intervenes only when there is a felt fear of the potential power of a foreign cinema, and particularly when the products—and therefore the ideologies and values—of a foreign cinema are widely circulated within a nation-state, and assumed to be having also a detrimental effect on that nation-state's economy. In other words, while it is conceptually useful to isolate a single national cinema, it is necessary also that it is seen in relation to other cinemas.

The same of course is true when we come to examine the cultural identity of a particular national cinema. The areas that need to be examined here are, first, the content or subject matter of a particular body of films—that which is represented (and particularly the construction of "the national character"), the dominant narrative discourses and dramatic themes, and the narrative traditions

and other source material on which they draw (and particularly the degree to which they draw on what has been constructed as the national heritage, literary, theatrical or otherwise)—in other words, the ways in which cinema inserts itself alongside other cultural practices, and the ways in which it draws on the existing cultural histories and cultural traditions of the producing nation, reformulating them in cinematic terms, appropriating them to build up its own generic conventions. Second, there is the question of the sensibility, or structure of feeling, or world-view expressed in those films. And third, there is the area of the style of those films, their formal systems of representation (the forms of narration and motivation which they employ, their construction of space and staging of action, the ways which they structure narrative and time, the modes of performance they employ and the types of visual pleasure, spectacle and display with which they engage), and their modes of address and constructions of subjectivity (and particularly the degree to which they engage in the construction of fantasy and the regulation of audience knowledge).

In considering cinema in terms of cultural identity, it is necessary also to pay attention to the processes by which cultural hegemony is achieved within each nation-state; to examine the internal relations of diversification and unification, and the power to institute one particular aspect of a pluralistic cultural formation as politically dominant and to standardise or naturalise it. Historical accounts of national cinemas have too often been premised on unproblematised notions of nationhood and its production. The search for a stable and coherent national identity can only be successful at the expense of repressing internal differences, tensions and contradictions—differences of class, race, gender, region, etc. It is important also to pay attention to historical shifts in the construction of nationhood and national identity: nationhood is always an image constructed under particular conditions, and indeed nationalism itself, as a concept in the modern sense, can only be traced back to the late eighteenth century.[19] "History," as Benedict Anderson puts it, "is the necessary basis of the national narrative."[20]

As Stephen Heath has suggested, "nationhood is not a given, it is always something to be gained"[21]—and cinema needs to be understood as one of the means by which it is "gained." Thus, definitions of British cinema, for instance, almost always involve, on the one hand, the construction of an imaginary homogeneity of identity and culture, an already achieved national identity, apparently shared by all British subjects; and on the other hand, the valorisation of a very particular conception of "British cinema," which involves ignoring whole areas of British cinema history. In each case, a process of inclusion and exclusion is enacted, a process whereby one thing is centralised, at the same time necessarily marginalising another, a process wherein the interests of one particular social group are represented as in the collective or national interest, producing what Anderson has called "the imagined community of the nation."[22]

Proclamations of national cinema are thus in part one form of "internal cultural colonialism": it is, of course, the function of institutions—and in this case national cinemas—to pull together diverse and contradictory discourses, to articulate a contradictory unity, to play a part in the hegemonic process of achieving consensus, and containing difference and contradiction.[23] It is this state of contradictoriness which must always be borne in mind in any discussion of national cinema. Cinema never simply reflects or expresses an already fully-formed and homogeneous national culture and identity, as if it were the undeniable property of all national subjects; certainly, it privileges only a limited range of subject positions which thereby become naturalised or reproduced as the only legitimate positions of the national subject. But it needs also to be seen as actively working to construct subjectivity as well as simply expressing a pre-given identity.

National cinema is, then, a complex issue, and I would argue that it is inadequate to reduce the study of national cinema only to consideration of the films produced by and within a particular nation-state. It is important to take into account the film culture as a whole, and the overall institution of cinema and to address the following issues:

- the range of films in circulation within a nation-state—including American and other foreign film—and how they are taken up at the level of exhibition; in the present as, of course, film art "in

circulation" and "exhibited" or on display in a variety of ways, and not just to be physically pcojected at cinemas (multiplexes, city-centre cinemas, art-house cinemas, etc.): they are available on video and via the various forms of broadcast and cable television as *films*, but they are also present and recycled in popular culture *intertextually*, as icons, reference points, standards and pastiches;

- the range of sociologically specific audiences for different types of film, and how these audiences use these films in particular exhibition circumstances; that is to say, we need to take into account not only the historically constituted reading practices and modes of spectatorship and subjectivity, the mental machinery and relative cultural power or readerly competences of different audiences—but also the experience of cinema(s) in a more general cultural semse: the role of marketing and audience expectation, the reasons why particular audiences go to the cinema, the pleasures they derive from this activity, the specific nature of the shared social and communal experience of cinema-going, differentiated according to class, race, gender, age, etc., the role of television (and video) in mediating and transforming the experience of cinema, the different experiences offered by the various types of theatrical exhibition spaces. It is worth remembering that, from the point of view of economic historians such as Douglas Gomery, film industries marked by a high degree of horizontal and vertical integration can be seen as no more nor less than highly diversified cinema circuits, where production is a necessary high-risk service industry, and where cinemas are as much luxurious sites for the consumption of or advertising for commodities other than films, as they are sites for the fantasy experience of watching fitms;[24]
- the range of and relation between discourses about film circulating within that cultural and social formation, and their relative accessibility to different audiences. Crucial among these discourses is the tension between, on the one hand, those intellectual discourses which insist that a proper national cinema must be one which aspires to the status of art (and therefore adheres to the current dominant definitions of cinema as an art

form), discourses which, from a particular class perspective, dismiss Hollywood's popular cinema as culturally debilitating; and on the other hand, those more populist discourses where, in effect, the idea of "good entertainment" overrides questions of "art" or "nationality." This latter discourse suggests that a cinema can only be national, and command a national-popular audience if it is a mass-production genre cinema, capable of constructing, reproducing, and recycling popular myths on a broad scale, with an elaborate, well capitalised and well resourced system of market exploitation. Again, the role of television must be taken into account as one of agents which generates, sustains and regulates film cultures and renders discourses about the cinema more or less accessible.

To explore national cinema in these terms means laying much greater stress on the point of consumption, and on the *use* of film (sounds, images, narratives, fantasies), than on the point of production. It involves a shift in emphasis away from the analysis of film texts as vehicles for the articulation of nationalist sentiment and the interpellation of the implied national spectator, to an analysis of how actual audiences construct their cultural identity in relation to the various products of the national and international film and television industries, and the conditions under which this is achieved.

The current state of film studies is characterised by a tension between those who are working on the political economics of cinema and those who analyse and investigate textuality and the putative spectator, and by the corresponding absence of much work on actual audiences, beyond the examination of critical discourses. Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson have proposed the most acceptable form of relationship or mediation between political economy and textuality in terms of a sort of sociology of organisations and professional ideologies.[25] Clearly, this is something that could be fruitfully explored in relation to other national cinemas. But it doesn't at present help to bridge the gap between textual analysis, the analysis of critical discourses in print-form, and the vast continent of the popular audiences for film—and the question of audiences has to be

crucial for the study of national cinemas. For what is a national cinema if it doesn't have a national audience?

NOTES

1. This article is based on a chapter from a PhD thesis which I am currently preparing. I would like to acknowledge the work of Thomas Elsaesser in enabling me to develop some of the arguments advanced here.

2. Susan Barrowclough, "Introduction: The Dilemmas of a National Cinema," in Barrowclough, ed., *Jean-Pierre Lefebere: The Quebec Connection* (BFI Dossier no. 13, 1981), 3.

3. "Popular culture," *New Formations* 2 (Summer 1987): 80.

4. "Chronicle of a Death Retold: Hyper, Retro or Counter-Cinema," *Monthly Film Bulletin* 54:641 (June 1987): 167.

5. *New German Cinema: A History* (London, BFI/Macmillan, 1989), 6–7.

6. "Narrating the Nation," *Times Literary Supplement*, June 13, 1986, 659; see also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

7. Elsaesser, "Chronicle of a Death Retold," 166.

8. See Nowell-Smith, *New Formations*, op. cit., 81.

9. "But Do We Need It?" in Martin Autry and Nick Roddick, eds., *British Cinema Now* (London: BFI, 1985), 152. For other writers advancing a similar argument, see also Paul Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Post-War Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul Willemen, "In Search of an Alternative Perspective: An Interview with Armand and Michelle Mattelait," *Framework* 26–27 (1985): 56; Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, "Gramsci and the National-Popular," *Screen Education* 22 (Spring 1977); Don MacPherson, "The Labour Movement and Oppositional Cinema: Introduction," in *Traditions of Independence* (London: BFI, 1990), 127–28; Peter Miles and Malcolm Smith, *Cinema, Literature, and Society: Élite and Mass Culture in Inter-War Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 170–78; Robert Murphy, "A Rival to Hollywood? The British Film Industry in the Thirties," *Screen* 24:4–5 (July–October 1983).

10. See Tony Aldgate, "Comedy, Class and Containment: The British Domestic Cinema of the 1930s," in James Curran and Vincent Porter, eds., *British Cinema History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983). See also my "Saturday Night or Sunday Morning? British Cinema in the Fifties," in *Ideas and Production* IX–X (1989): 146–49.

11. Nowell-Smith, "But Do We Need It?" 152.

12. "Popular Culture and Hegemony in Post-War Britain," in *Politics, Ideology and Popular Culture*, Unit 18 of Open University Popular Culture course (U203), 13.

13. See, e.g., David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, *The Classical Hollywood Cinema* (London: RKP, 1985); Barry Salt, *Film Style and Technology: History and Analysis* (London: Starwood, 1983); Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment* (London: BFI, 1986); Charles Barr, ed., *All Our Yesterdays: 90 Years of British Cinema* (London: BFI, 1986); Roy Armes, *A Critical History of British Cinema* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1978).

14. Elsaesser, *New German Cinema*, 3 and 39.

15. "Art Cinema as Institution," *Screen* 22:1 (1981): 11.

16. Elsaesser, *New German Cinema*, 49.

17. See Neale, op. cit., 34–35.

18. See chapters on the film industry in Curran and Porter, eds., op. cit., and Barr, ed., op. cit.; and Margaret Dickinson and Sarah Street, *Cinema and State* (London: BFI, 1985).

19. See Eugene Kamenka, "Political Nationalism: The Evolution of the Idea," in Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 3–20; and Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain* (London: Verso, 1981), 329–41.

20. Op. cit., 659.

21. "Questions of Property: Film and Nationhood," *Cine-tracts* 1:4 (Spring/Summer 1978): 10.

22. Op. cit., 659.

23. See Paul Willemen, "Remarks on *Screen*: Introductory Notes for a History of Contexts," *Southern Review* 16:2 (July 1983): 296.

24. See Douglas Gomery, *The Hollywood Studio System* (London: BFI/Macmillan, 1986).

25. Op. cit.